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State Control over the Reclamation Waterhole: Reality or
Mirage?
Many a less-than-epic Western novel has climaxed in a shootout
over a waterhole.I While little remains of the West of yesteryear, the
feud over the waterhole is still very much alive. Today, however, the
combatants are not gun-slinging cowboys, but brief-toting attorneys.
The past three decades have witnessed several courtroom showdowns between the Western states and the Department of the Inte-'
rior's Bureau of Reclamation over water appropriation for the
Bureau's reclamation projects.2 The states drew the battle lines by
trying to use their laws to regulate the Bureau's activities. The Constitution declares a clear winner in most conflicts between state and
federal law: the supremacy clause3 ordains that where Congress exercises constitutional power, its laws are the supreme law of the land.
Thus, if every act of the Bureau had the force of an act of Congress,
the states would have conceded subservience long ago. But in section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902,4 Congress itself limited the
Bureau's independence from state control. It stipulated that federal
reclamation plans were not totally exempt from state water laws.
This Note assesses how much state law section 8 saves from preemption. Section I reviews the interplay of state and federal water
law in the West. It begins with a brief description of appropriation,
the system of water rights found in the Western states, outlines the
Reclamation Act of 1902, and then traces the Supreme Court's
evolving construction of the Act. It culminates in a discussion of
Cal!fornia v. United States, 5 the Court's latest gloss on section 8.
Section II expands the analysis of the Cal!fornia decision, integrating
it with traditional preemption doctrine. It shows that section 8 re-.
spects state law unless a project cannot comply with both a state and
federal law or the state law is clearly inconsistent with a federal reclamation goal. Section III then turns to three specific questions left
open in Cal!fornia: (1) whether state water law provisions other than
those involving appropriation may be applied to federal projects; (2)
whether changes in state law may affect a complet~d federal project;
l. See, e.g., R. MANNING, TANGLED TRAIL 174-76 (1947); T. THOMPSON, BITIER WATER
(1960).
2. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 564 (1963); City of Fresno v. California, 372
U.S. 627 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275 (1958); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
4. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388; (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 373, 381, 383, 391, 392,411,416,
419, 421, 431, 432,434,439,461,476,491,498 (1976)).
5. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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and (3) whether a state law may block construction of a federal project. The Note concludes that although Cal!fornia does not foreclose
all future disagreement, it provides a coherent model for analyzing
disputes between the Bureau and the western states.

I. THE

HISTORY OF STATE WATER LAW AND THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION

A.

The Appropriation System
6

The Western states use the appropriation system of water rights,
rather than the riparian system7 common in Eastern states. Under
the appropriation system, water rights do not attach to the land bordering a stream or river, but vest in the individual who actually diverts water. Statutes in all the Western states, 8 and the constitutions
of many,9 limit water rights to the amount that an individual beneficially uses. 10 And in times of shortage, earlier appropriators have
6. The 17 states enumerated in 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1976). Sixteen of these - Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming - were included in the
original 1902 Act. The Act of June 12, 1906, ch. 3288, 34 Stat. 259, extended the provisions of
the 1902 Act to Texas.
7. The riparian doctrine is
[t]he system . . . in which owners oflands along the banks of a stream or water body have
the right to reasonable use of the waters and a correlative right protecting against unreasonable use by others that substantially diminishes the quantity or quality of water. The
right is appurtenant to the land and does not depend upon prior use.
7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 310 (R. Clark ed. 1976).
8. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE§ 1240 (West 1971): ''The appropriation must be for some
useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to
use it for such a purpose the right ceases." Both Nevada and New Mexico provide that
"[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water."
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 533.035 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (1978).
9. The California provision, CAL. CONST. art XIV, § 3, is typical:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general
welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable . . . . The right to water ... is and shall be limited to
such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served • • • •
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art XVII, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art.
§§ l, 3; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15.
IO. The definition of"beneficial use" is necessarily vague. Several states have attempted to
codify a definition. For example:
"Beneficial use" means a use of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons or
the public, including but not limited to agricultural (including stock water), domestic, fish
and wildlife, industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power, and recreational uses. A use
of water for slurry to export coal from Montana is not a beneficial use.
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-2911 (4) (Supp. 1977). The statute formerly provided that a
" '[b]eneficial use' means any economically or socially justifiable withdrawal or utilization of
water." MONT. REv. CODES ANN.§ 89-291 l(d) (1947) (amended 1973). In addition, see TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.023 (Vernon 1972).
Examples of judicially defined beneficial uses include the use of water power to operate a
flouring mill, Isaacs v. Barber, IO Wash. 124, 38 P. 871 (1894), and to develop and maintain a
power plant. Thompson Co. v. Pennebaker, 173 F. 849 (9th Cir. 1909).
Courts have held the following uses not to be beneficial: diversion of water solely for
drainage, Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 262 (1857); a claim to water for speculation, Weaver v.

xv.
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superior claims to those who began using the water later. 11
To obtain a right to use water, an individual must apply to a state
agency, often the state engineer. 12 The agency reviews the application, determining whether any unappropriated water in the stream is
available.· If so, the agency examines the proposed use and may impose conditions to ensure that the water will satisfy the beneficial use
requirement. 13 In several states, the state agency must also ensure
that the proposed use is in the "public interest." 14 If the agency is
Eureka Lake Co., 15 Cal. 271 (1860); the application of water to sage brush land without
significantly increasing the growth of native grasses, Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v: Twin Falls
Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 F. 9 (9th Cir. 1917); winter irrigation of land for the
purpose of drowning gophers in an area greatly needing water, Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. LindseyStrathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 568, 45 P.2d 1007 (1935).
South Dakota uses still another statutory route to defining "beneficial use," limiting the
amount of irrigation water to two acre-feet of water per acre annually (up to three acre-feet if
the method of irrigation or the type of soil requires it). Any use in excess of three acre-feet is
per se not a beneficial use. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 46-5-4 to -6 (1967 and Supp. 1979).
Moreover, an appropriator may be denied his full allocation ifhe fails to use the entire amount
beneficially.
An appropriator's allocation is determined by one of two methods. Water rights antedating
modem permit systems are quantified in court-issued decrees arising out of a general adjudication involving the water users on a particular stream. The rights of individuals seeking appropriations after the permit system had been established are quantified in a state-issued permit.
11. See, e.g., Tex. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.027 (Vernon 1972) ("As between appropriators, the first in time is the first in right."). As a result of this basic principle of the appropriation system, the oldest rights to divert from a stream have a much greater economic and
practical worth than do relatively recent appropriations.
12. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.§ 537.130 (1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 73-3-1, -2 (1953);
WASH. Rev. CODE § 90.03.250 (1974).
13. The authority of a state agency to attach beneficial use conditions is generally not
stated expressly in the statute, but is implied from the duty imposed on the agency by the state'
statute or constitution prohibiting appropriations unless the beneficial use requirement is satisfied. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
14. The basic difference between the beneficial use and public interest requirements lies in
the fact that in-stream values historically have not been accounted for in defining "beneficial
use." See note 15 infra and accompanying text. The beneficial use requirement generally
balances the relative merits of the proposed water use only against other competing out-ofstream uses. On the other hand, the public interest evaluation is much broader, weighing the
proposed use against its impact on the local environment. For example, some statutes order a
public interest evaluation even if the beneficial use requirement has been met:
If a proposed use neither will impair a use under an existing water right nor prejudicially
and unreasonably affect the public interest, the chief engineer shall approve all applications. . . . Otherwise the chief engineer shall make an order rejecting such application or
requiring its modification to conform to the public interest to the end that the highest
public benefit and maximum economical development may result from the use of such
water.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-71 l (1977). Accord, Nev. REV. STAT. § 533.370(1) (1977); OR. REV.
STAT.§ 537.190(1) (1977); WASH. Rev. CODE§ 90.03.290 (1974). Oklahoma's similar provision applies only to withdrawals of water by the United States:
[I)f the [Water Resources] Board finds that the withdrawal of waters requested [by the
United States) is not in the best interests of the state, then the Board shall
1. Have the authority to reduce the amount requested for withdrawal; and/or
2. Attach such conditions to the proposed withdrawal as the Board deems in harmony with the best interest of the state; or
3. Reject the request for withdrawal in its entirety.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.29 (West. Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). The constitutionality of
this statute has not yet been tested.
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satisfied, it issues a permit authorizing the proposed use for so long
as it meets the statutory conditions.
A significant shortcoming of the appropriation system is that until recently an appropriator had to actually divert water from the
stream to obtain a vested right in water. Thus in-stream uses - for
recreation, fish, and wildlife, among others - could not be valid appropriations.15 In theory, appropriators could withdraw all the
water from a stream, leaving none for in-stream uses. Due in part to
growing ecological concerns, several states have recently altered
their appropriation systems to protect in-stream uses.1 6
B.

The Reclamation Act of 1902

Until late in the nineteenth century, the federal government took
a passive role in the development of the West's water resources.
Congress's first attempt to help develop irrigation was the ill-fated
Carey Act of 1894, 17 which demonstrated that large scale reclama15. The National Water Commission pointed out this shortcoming in state water law:
The water law systems of most of the States . . . are deficient in that they fail to give
appropriate recognition to social values of water. These values arise primarily from such
instream uses as fish and wildlife propagation, recreation, and esthetics. The appropria•
tion law of the Western States generally requires diversion of water from the stream or
lake and its application to beneficial use in order for a water right to be created. Instream
values are thus heavily discounted; water has been diverted from streams to such an ex•
tent that instream values which should have been protected frequently have been im•
paired, and sometimes destroyed.
U.S. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. WATER POLICY 63 (1973).
See generally Tarlock, Recent J)evelopments in the Recognition of Ins/ream Uses in Weslern
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871; Tarlock, Appropriationfar Instream Flow Maintenance: A
Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211.
16. Some states have used the "public interest" requirement in the permit evaluation stage
to modify or deny a permit that would harm in-stream uses. For typical "public interest"
statutes, see note 14 supra.
Another statutory technique for protecting in-stream uses is the withdrawal of certain wa- .
ters from the amount available for appropriation. Montana, for example, has provided that
[t]he states or any political subdivision or agency thereof, or the United States, or any
agency thereof, may apply to the board to reserve waters for existing or future beneficial
uses, or to maintain a minimum fl.ow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at
such periods or for such length of time as the board designates.
MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 89-890(1) (Supp. 1977). The Oregon legislature has specifically
withdrawn the water of enumerated streams from appropriation or diversion. OR. REV. STAT,
§§ 536.410, 538.110- .300 (1977). Washington has achieved a similar result by authorizing the
State Department of Water Resources to establish minimum flow levels for streams. See
WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.22.010 (1974). Colorado and Arizona allow state agencies to appropri•
ate water for in-stream uses without requiring actual diversion. See COLO. REV. STAT, § 37•
92-102 (3) (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-141(A) (Supp. 1978).
17. Ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422 (1894) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 641 (1976)). The Carey Act
provided that the United States would donate one million acres of land to each state that
participated through constructing large irrigation projects. The states were then to sell the land
to settlers in 160-acre tracts. The burden of financing the projects, which rested initially upon
the states and private concerns, and eventually upon the heavily mortgaged farmers who
purchased the lands se~yilie projects, proved immense. See Sax, Federal Reclamation
Law, in 2 WATE~ND WATER RIGHTS 111, 120-21 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Trelease, Reclamation
Water Rights,32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 464-65 (1960).

December 1979)

Note -

Reclamation Projects

231

tion projects were not profitable undertakings. To reclaim the West,
an alternative to private funding would be needed.
The search for a feasible means of reclaiming the arid lands of
the West bore fruit in the Reclamation Act of 1902. 18 The Act created the Bureau of Reclamation (then the Reclamation Service) to
administer projects that would be funded from the sale of public
lands. Congress intended to recoup its investment, with the project
costs to be repaid eventually by the users of the reclamation water.
Since the tum of the century, Congress has amended the Act several
times 19 and has authorized specific projects by individual acts. 20
There are presently over 165 federal reclamation projects in operation.21
In drafting the Reclamation Act of 1902, one of the major questions was the role state water law would play in the federal reclamation scheme. Congress's ambiguous answer was section 8:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used in
irrigation, or any vested rights acquired thereunder, and the Secretary
of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall proceed
in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any state or of the Federal Government or of any
landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any inter-state
stream or the waters thereof: Provided, the right to the use of water
acquired under the provisions of this act shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and
the limit of the right. 22
18. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 373, 383, 391, 392, 411, 416,
419, 421, 431, 432, 434, 439, 461, 491, & 498 (1976)).
19. E.g., Act of Feb. 2, 1911, ch. 32, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 895 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 374
(1976)); Act of May 20, 1920, ch. 192, §§ 1-3, 41 Stat. 605 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 375 (1976));
Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, § 8, 58 Stat. 891 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 390 (1976)); Act of June
29, 1948, ch. 733, § 1, 62 Stat. 1108 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 385a (1976)).
20. E.g., Act of Aug. 2, 1937, ch. 55, 50 Stat. 557, as amended, Act of Apr. 9, 1938, ch. 134,
52 Stat. 211, Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 637, § 1, 69 Stat. 556 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 600a (1976))
(Arch Hurley Conservatory District Project, New Mexico); Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1183, § l,
64 Stat. I 124 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 600b (1976)) (Canadian River Reclamation Project,
Texas); Act of Feb. 25, 1956, ch. 71, § 1, 70 Stat. 28 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 615 (1976))
(Washita River Basin Reclamation Project, Oklahoma); Act of Aug. 6, 1956, ch. 980, § 1, 70
Stat. 1058 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 615f (1976)) (Crooked River Federal Reclamation Project,
Oregon).
21. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WATER & LAND RESOURCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 1975 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (1976).
22. Ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976)). As codified in 43
U.S.C. § 383 (1976), the enumeration "sections 372,373,383,392,411,416,419,421,431,432,
434,439,461,491 and 498 of this title" is substituted for the words "this Act" that appear in
the Statutes at Large. These enumerated sections were the original sections of the 1902 Act. It
is generally assumed that the acts supplementing and amending the 1902 Act incorporated§ 8,
so the specific enumeration in 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976) should not be taken as a limitation of its
effect. See Sax, Problems ofFederalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. Cow. L. REV. 49 (1964),
for an analysis of the effect of§ 8 before California.
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If Congress had desired, it could have preempted the application
of state law to Bureau projects entirely.23 Section 8, however, indicates that Congress did not exercise its full power, but instead intended state law to govern some aspects of the reclamation projects.
The question is, what aspects? 24

C.

The Supreme Court and Section 8

Ivanhoe Irrigation .District v. McCracken 25 was the Supreme
Court's first significant opportunity to construe section 8, nearly
fifty-six years after its enactment. Section 5 of the Reclamation Act
imposed a 160-acre limitation on water deliveries from federal reclamation projects.26 In Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court of California had
determined that California law forbade such a limitation and had
held that section 8 required the Bureau to comply with state law to deliver water without regard to the 160-acre limitation.27 The
Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "Section 5 is a specific and
mandatory prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the
operation of reclamation projects . . . . [W]e do not believe that
Congress intended § 8 to override the repeatedly reaffirmed national
policy of§ 5."28 The Court cautioned that it was not "passing generally on the coverage of§ 8 in the delicate area of federal-state relations in the irrigation field," 29 but then proceeded to do exactly that:
As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with
state law when . . . it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights
or vested interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not
23. Two ·sources of congressional power would justify the total preemption of state water
law affecting federal reclamation projects. First, the commerce clause gives Congress the ability to regulate commerce on navigable streams. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S.
377 (1940). Second, Congress created Bureau projects under its power to tax and spend for the
general welfare, contained in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). However, it may be noted that congressional power over
reclamation was much less certain in 1902, and § 8 may have been an attempt by Congress to
assure that the 1902 Act would not be ruled unconstitutional.
24. Over the years, commentators have expressed a wide variety of views on the extent to
which § 8 recognizes state law. These theories have ranged from a ''veto theory," contending
that § 8 allows a state to prevent any Bureau project not fully complying with state law, to a
"proprietary theory," which reads § 8 only to require that state law be used for defining the
property interests that the Bureau must compensate when it exercises its power of eminent
domain. For an explanation of the basis for the veto theory (although not an endorsement of
it), see Sax, supra note 22, at 62-69. For an elaboration on the proprietary theory, see the
Supreme Court opinions discussed in the text at notes 26-40 & 61 infra.
25. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
26. 32 Stat. 389 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976)). Congress inserted the 160-acre
limitation into the Act to ensure that one of its major purposes, the settlement of the West by
small farmers, would not be frustrated by monopolization and speculation. See Sax, supra
note 17, at 210.
27. Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 506 P.2d 824 (1957).
28. 357 U.S. at 291-92.
29. 357 U.S. at 292.
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be confused with the operation of federal pr9jects. . . We read nothing in§ 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions
imposed by the state.30

The Supreme Court reiterated the Ivanhoe dicta five years later
in City of Fresno v. Cal!fornia. 31 Fresno had sought a declaratory
judgment that California's statutory priority of domestic use over irrigation and watershed-of-origin uses,32 coupled with section 8, prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from giving priority to irrigation
users and charging more for municipal water than for irrigation
water. 33 The Secretary had claimed authority to favor irrigation
under section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939.34 Instead
of limiting its opinion to the specific conflict between section 9(c) and
section 8, and explaining that section 8 was not intended to override
specific mandates of subsequent reclamation laws, the Court painted
in much broader strokes: "The effect of§ 8 . . . is to leave to state
law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made."35
The Court continued to espouse a proprietary interpretation of
section 8 in Arizona v. Ca!!fornia, 36 a case arising under the Boulder
Canyon Project Act.37 In Arizona, the Court was asked whether
state or federal law would govern the distribution of project water to
users within the three states principally involved in the project.38
The Court explained:
The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires the United
States in the delivery of water to follow priorities laid down by state
law has already been disposed of by the Court in Ivanhoe . . . and
reaffirmed in City of Fresno . . . . Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act
did not subject the Secretary to state law in [Ivanhoe], we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the Secretary must be bound by state
law in disposing of water under the Project Act. 39
30. 357 U.S. at 291-92.
31. 372 U.S. 627 (1963). Fresno was decided the same day as Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963), which involved the same fact situation. The Court's opinion in .Dugan provides a more
comprehensive review of the issues and factual background than Fresno.
32. CAL. WATER CODE§§ 11460, 11463 (Wesi 1971).
33. 372 U.S. at 629-30.
34. Ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1195 (1939) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 48h{c) (1976)) provides
that "[n]o contract relating to municipal water supply ... shall be made unless in the judgment of the Secretary, it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes."
35. 372 U.S. at 630.
36. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
37. Ch. 42, § 1, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976)). Section 14 of the
Boulder Canyon Project Act incorporates the 1902 Act: "This subchapter shall be deemed a
supplement to the reclamation law, which said reclamation law shall govern the construction,
operation, and management of the words herein authorized . . . ." Ch. 42, § 14, 45 Stat. 1065
(1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617m (1976)).
38. The Court was also confronted with apportionment of the waters of the Colorado
River among the various states of the lower Colorado Basin. 373 U.S. at 551.
39. 373 U.S. at 586-87.
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The Court was heavily influenced by the multistate nature of the
Project.40 It believed that Congress did not intend section 8 to frustrate its comprehensive plan for the distribution of water within a
multistate area.
Taken together, Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona appeared to lay to
rest any notion that states could regulate federal reclamation
projects. After .fifteen years of hibernation, however, the savings
clause of section 8 reasserted its vitality in Cal!fornia v. United
States. 41
D.

Cal!fornia v. United States

In 1933, California authorized the Central Valley Project to reclaim Central California.42 The Project "envisioned the coordinated
development of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their
tributaries through a system of physical works to regulate and distribute water needed for agriculture, industrial, and municipal uses
in the Central Valley of California."43 The state found itself unable
to finance the Project, however, and in 1935 it sought and received
federal aid.44 As phases of the original Central Valley Project were
completed, Congress authorized additional units. In 1944,45 and
again in 1962,46 it authorized the New Melones Project, the specific
unit whose activities ultimately gave the Supreme Court another
look at section 8.
40. 373 U.S. at 587-88.
41. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
42. Central Valley Project Act of 1933, 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 1042. For a detailed factual
background of the Central Valley Project, see Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275,
279-84 (1958); Decision 1422, California State Water Resources Control Board (1973).
43. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 878-79 (E.D. Cal. 1975). Referring to the
scope of the Project, the Supreme Court noted that
Central Valley is the largest single undertaking yet embarked upon under the federal
reclamation program. It was born in the minds of farseeing Californians in their endeavor to bring to that State's parched acres a water supply sufficiently permanent to
transform them into a veritable garden for the benefit of mankind.
Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 280 (1958).
44. Congress authorized the Central Valley Project in the Rivers and Harbors Act of Aug.
30, 1934, Pub. L. No. 74-409, 49 Stat. 1028; Rivers and Harbors Act of Aug. 26, 1937, Pub. L.
No. 75-392, § 2, 50 Stat. 850; Rivers and Harbors Act of Oct. 17, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-868, 54
Stat. 1198.
45. Flood Control Act of Dec. 22, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (reauthorized in
1962).
46. The Flood Control Act of 1962, which reauthorized the Project, provides that "the
[New Melones] project shall become an integral part of the Central Valley Project, and be
operated and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Federal reclamation
laws." Flood Control Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, 76 Stat. 1180, 1191. The New
Melones Project provides for a dam on the Stanislaus River, approximately 35 miles northeast
of Modesto, California, to create a reservoir impounding 2.4 million acre-feet of water for
irrigation, flood control, municipal use, domestic use, industrial use, power, recreation, and
water quality control. The waters involved originate and flow totally within the state of California.
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In issuing appropriation permits for the New Melones Project,
the California Water Resource Control Board imposed twenty-five
conditions on water use.47 These conditions, attached in the ordinary course of permit evaluation,48 reflected the Board's desire that
the proposed use be beneficial and further the public interest.49 The
Board was not convinced that the Bureau of Reclamation needed
water;50 it feared that the proposed use would interfere with recreational and commercial interests51 and it questioned the value of
47. Ironically, the dispute might have been avoided had California chosen to protect instream uses by a method other than attaching conditions to an appropriation permit. If California had used a statute allowing a state agency to set aside water for in-stream use, as Colorado does, the level of water necessary to safeguard in-stream uses would have already been
appropriated by the state. See note 16 supra. There simply would not have been as much
unappropriated water available for the Bureau. Consequently, the question of the validity of
state-imposed conditions would not have arisen.
48. Under California law, an appropriator must apply for and receive a permit before any
water is withdrawn. See CAL. WATER CODE§§ 1201, 1250-1258 (West 1971). The Board will
issue permits if it determines that there is sufficient unappropriated water and that the proposed use will be reasonable, beneficial, and in the public interest. See CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 1240, 1255 (West 1971).
The Bureau has regularly applied to the Board for appropriation permits and has acquired
at least 41 since 1945, each containing various conditions. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8,
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). Until recently, it has consistently complied
with these conditions.
In 1972, the Bureau applied for four appropriation permits for the New Melones Project.
Numerous individuals, corporations, public agencies, and private associations entered protests
to those applications. They objected primarily to the manner in which the Project would be
operated, especially regarding the protection of downstream rights, the preservation of water
quality, the location of areas to be served by the Project, and the purposes for which water
would be used.
49. Under California law the Board has broad discretion in determining whether issuance
of a permit to appropriate water will serve the public interest. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1255
(West 1971); Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).
50. The lack of evidence the New Melones Project will be needed for consumptive use
outside the four basin counties . . . at any definite time in the future, raises substantial
doubt whether permits should be issued to impound more water in New Melones Reservoir, at least at this time, than is needed for satisfaction of prior rights and nonconsumptive purposes - protection and enhancement of fish and wildlife, water quality,
recreation and generation of power.
Decision 1422, at 17 (1973). The Board noted that the "Bureau has presented no specific plan
for applying project water to beneficial use for consumptive purposes at any particular location. Furthermore, the record shows that the CVP has substantial quantities of water that are
not being used and are not under contract." Decision 1422, at 14 (1973).
51. In view of the preponderance of the adverse consequences of maintaining a reservoir
of the size proposed by the Bureau, the public interest requires that any permit issued
pursuant to applications 14858 and 19304 prohibit the impoundment of water in New
Melones Reservoir for consumptive purposes until further order of the Board following a
showing that the benefits that will accrue from a specific _proposed use will outweigh any
damage that would result to fish, wildlife and recreation m tlie watershed above the New
Melones Dam and that the permitee has firm commitments to deliver water for such purpose.
Decision 1422, at 18 (1973). The Board was also concerned about the effect of the Project on
the Stanislaus River salmon fishing industry. In addition to further study on the matter, the
Board ordered that up to 98,000 acre-feet annually be released at a rate and timing specified by
the Department of Fish and Game. The Board felt that it should retain jurisdiction to revise
this requirement after further studies were completed. Decision 1422, at 20-21 (1973).
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damming the river for hydroelectric purposes.52
Because of these concerns, the Board imposed rather demanding
conditions on the New Melones permits. It deferred full impoundment of waters until the Bureau demonstrated a plan for their use. 53
It also required the Bureau to study further the ecological effects of
the Project,54 imposed deadlines for construction and for application
of the waters to beneficial uses,55 demanded access to the Project,56
mandated specific construction procedures, 57 and reserved jurisdiction to impose further conditions to ensure beneficial use of Project
water. 58
The Bureau vigorously objected to the conditions in the permits
and sought a declaratory judgment in the Eastern District of California that it could appropriate water without applying to the Board. 59
Alternatively, the Bureau contended that when it did apply to the
Board as a matter of comity, the Board could not attach conditions
to the permit. 60 After a lengthy review of the legislative history of
section 8 and the Supreme Court cases construing it, the district
court identified two limited effects of the section. First, the court
said, section 8 "requires the federal government to look at state law
to define the property interests for which compensation must be
made pursuant to ... eminent domain proceedings [under section 7
of the Reclamation Act]."61 Second, it viewed section 8 as reaffirming the doctrine that "states are free to [choose] their own rules of
water law"62 and that the federal government cannot impose either a
riparian or an appropriation system. The court concluded that comity requireq the Bureau, when acquiring water for projects, to comply with the "forms" of state law, but not the "substance."63
52. Decision 1422, at 21-24 (1973). The Board felt that the value of maintaining the river's
existing water flow outweighed the value of water storage for hydroelectric production. As a
result, the permit issued greatly reduced the Bureau's planned water storage behind the New
Melones Dam. Decision 1422, at 24 (1973).
53. Conditions l and 2, Decision l<J22, at 29-30 (1973).
54. Conditions 3, 7, 8, 12, and 21, Decision 1422, at 30-35 (1973).
55. Conditions 10 and 11, Decision 1422, at 32 (1973).
56. Conditions 15 and 16, Decision 1322, at 33 (1973).
57. For example, condition 18 required the Bureau to clear the reservoir site of vegetation,
and condition 17 required an outlet pipe of adequate size in the stream bed to allow release of
water entering the reservoir above the amount authorized for impoundment. Decision 1422, at
34 (1973).
58. Conditions 6, 9, 13, 20, and 22, Decision 1422, at 31-35 (1973).
59. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 877 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
60. 403 F. Supp. at 877.
61. 403 F. Supp. at 887. This interpretation of§ 8 is what is commonly referred to as the
"proprietary theory," as opposed to the "veto theory." See note 24 supra. Section 7 of the
Reclamation Act, containing the eminent domain provisions, is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 421
(1976).
62. 403 F. Supp. at 887-88.
63. 403 F. Supp. at 889-90.
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Accordingly, the court granted the declaratory judgment for the
United States, limited only by a requirement that the Bureau apply
to the Board as a matter of comity.64 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this
judgment,65 but indicated that the Bureau must apply to the Board
for a permit as a matter of law rather than of comity.66
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, explaining that the
legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 - particularly
that of section 8 - made it "clear that state law was expected to
control in two important respects."67 First, the "Secretary [of the
Interior must] appropriate, purchase, or condemn necessary water
rights in strict conformity with state law."68 Second, the "distribution [of waters] to individual landowners would [also] ... be controlled by state law."69 The Court expressly disapproved the
distinction created by the lower courts between the form and the
substance of state law, holding that the legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 made it "abundantly clear that Congress intended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state water
law."70 Thus, section 8 allows states to "impose any condition on the
'control, appropriation, use or distribution of water' by a federal reclamation project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional directives respecting the project."71
To reach this conclusion, the Court had to distinguish Ivanhoe,
Fresno, and Arizona. It began by restricting Ivanhoe and Fresno to
their facts:
[W]e disavow the dictum to the extent that it would prevent [states]
from imposing conditions on ... permit[s] granted to the United
States which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions authorizing the project in question. Section 8 cannot be read to require the
Secretary to comply with state law only when it becomes necessary to
purchase or condemn vested water rights. . . . [I]t also requires the
Secretary to comply with state law in the "control, appropriation, use
or distribution of water." 72

The majority then distinguished Arizona. It explained that the Arizona Court had decided that "because of the unique size and multistate scope of the [Boulder Canyon] Project, Congress did not intend
64. 403 F. Supp. at 902-03.
65. United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
66. 558 F.2d at 1351.
67. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665 (1978).
68. 438 U.S. at 665.
69. 438 U.S. at 667.
70. 438 U.S. at 675.
71. 438 U.S. at 675. Since the district court held that no conditions could be attached to an
appropriation permit, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for a determination of whether the conditions in Decision 1422 were inconsistent with clear congressional
mandates. 438 U.S. at 679.
72. 438 U.S. at 674-75.
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the States to interfere with the Secretary's power to determine with
whom and on what terms water contracts would be made."73 Therefore, the California Court reasoned, the Arizona Court had not
needed to reaffirm the dicta of Ivanhoe and Fresno "except as it related to the singular legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act." 74 Beyond that particular Act, Ivanhoe and Fresno stood
only for the proposition that "state water law does not control in the
distribution of reclamation water if [it is] inconsistent with ... congressional directives."75

II.

INTERPRETING CALIFORNIA

In California, the Court construed section 8 to require the Bureau
to comply with state law unless it is inconsistent with a clear congressional directive.76 Beyond its own facts, California's language offers
73. 438 U.S. at 674.
74. 438 U.S. at 674.
75. 438 U.S. at 668 n.21.
76. An interesting side issue concerns the meaning of the phrase "congressional directive,"
This Note assumes that it encompasses the provisions of the reclamation acts and the statutes
authorizing specific reclamation projects, but there are problems even with this generalization.
"Reclamation law" is customarily defined as "the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and all
Acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto." 43 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1976). But while
some laws relating to reclamation state that they are to be deemed a supplement to the reclamation law, a number of important laws that affect reclamation neither describe themselves as
such, nor expressly amend existing reclamation law. See Sax, supra note 17, at 123-25. Professor Sax also notes that
reclamation laws are further complicated by the unfortunate circumstances that, because
of congressional reluctance to repeal obsolete laws and because of the lack of modern
codification, the United States Code continues to carry a number of provisions that are
obviously made obsolete by subsequent enactments, and thus in practical effect repealed.
Id. at 124.
Another problem arises when state law conflicts not with a "reclamation law," but with a
federal statute outside of the "reclamation law" that in some manner affects the project. Since
§ 8 specifies that "nothing in this Act" shall affect state law, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 390 (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976)), it is limited to saving state law from preemption by reclamation laws.
Presumably, in such situations, an analysis of the legislative history of the federal statute in
question would have to be undertaken to see if Congress intended either to occupy the field or
in some other manner preempt state law. Section 8 would be irrelevant, and standard preemption doctrines would prevail. See generally Note, The Preemption J)octrine: Sh!fting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 15 CoLUM. L. Rev. 623 (1975).
A final difficulty involves the administrative rulings and decisions made pursuant to one of
· the several sections of the reclamation laws that grant the Secretary discretion to enact regulations and establish procedures to implement the legislation. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 373, 440,
485 (1976). Discussing the effect of regulations made by the Secretary, one court explained, "If
the rule amounts to nothing more than a regulation, the purport and tendency of which is to
carry into full force and effect the provisions of the act to which it refers, it is valid and has the
same binding force as the law itself." Clyde v. Cummings, 35 Utah 461,465, 101 P. 106, 108
(1909). If, on the other hand, the Secretary goes beyond merely implementing the statutes, his
regulations and rulings are invalid.
In analyzing this situation, one must remember that the Secretary is directed not only by
the statute he is implementing, but also by the federalism concerns of§ 8. If a conflict arises
between state law and the Bureau's regulation or ruling, preemption analysis should center on
the underlying statutes which the Secretary is claiming to implement by his regulation. If tlie
statute, under Cal!famia, is a "clear congressional directive" that overrides § 8, and the Secre-
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little guidance for resolving future federal-state water disputes. To
understand the case's implications, one must place it alongside Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona in the framework of preemption doctrine,
the analysis traditionally used by courts to resolve federal-state disputes. Preemption doctrine dictates that when Congress can legislate
constitutionally in a given area, determining whether a state law in
that area is preempted is no more than an analysis of congressional
intent. If the state law directly conflicts with a federal statute, the
state law must yield to the clear congressional desire. If, on the other
hand, there is no direct conflict with a federal statute, the validity of
the state law hinges on whether Congress intended 1) to "occupy the
field" and thereby preclude all state legislation in the area, whether
conflicting or not, or 2) to have nonconfiicting state laws complement
federal laws in the area.77 The remainder of this Section interprets
Ca!tfornia and its predecessors in light of these standard principles
of preemption, scrutinizing the decision's implications for future reclamation controversies.
A.

Occupying the Field

The more interesting question in most preemption fights is
whether Congress has occupied the field. In the area of reclamation
law, however, the language of section 8 seems to indicate clearly that
Congress did not intend to occupy the field. Nevertheless, in Ca!tfornia the Bureau of Reclamation offered an "occupying the field" argument. The Bureau contended that even if Congress in 1902 had
intended the Secretary to comply with state law, the array oflegislative enactments since that time had resulted in "such a comprehensive set of reclamation laws and policies that [Congress] has left no
room for imposition of mandatory state controls or conditions." 78
The Court blandly turned aside that argument, noting that even in
tary is validly implementing it, the regulation would preempt state law. If either of these
prerequisites is lacking, state law should control.
77. When Congress has unequivocally and expressly declared that its action is meant to be
exclusive, the state cannot regulate. For example, in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272
U.S. 605, 613 (1926), the Court found that Congress, by passing the Boiler Inspection Act and
vesting the Interstate Co=erce Co=ission with the responsibility to enforce it, precluded a
state requirement of safety equipment not required by the Co=ission. The Court held that
"[t]he broad scope of the authority conferred upon the Commission" indicates that Congress
"intended to occupy the field." See also Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947). The courts have usually required a
strong showing of congressional intent before declaring that the federal law was intended to
exclude state regulation, because any such conclusion "must rest on congressional intent to
regulate exclusively - to occupy totally - the field in question." Wallach, Whose Interest: A
Study ofAdministrative Preemption, 25 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 258, 263 (1975). See California
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949) ("Congressional purpose to displace local laws must be
clearly manifested.").
78. Brief for Appellee at 59, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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1902 the Reclamation Act was "not devoid of such directives." 79 To
the Court, the presence of mandatory directives together with section
8 in the 1902 Act was sufficient evidence that Congress did not intend by subsequent directives alone to occupy the entire reclamation
.field.80 In general, more explicit action would be needed to override
section S's language.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seems to have concluded that
Congress intended to occupy one comer of the reclamation .field, section 8 notwithstanding. The Court in Arizona v. Cal!fornia, 81 impressed by the vast size and multistate character of the Boulder
Canyon Project, decided that Congress had intended to preempt
completely any state law affecting the Project. In Cal!fornia, the
Court distinguished Arizona, reaffirming the unique scope of the
Boulder Project. At least in theory, the Court also left open the possibility that other Bureau projects could be classified as "comprehensive."
The general tenor of the Cal!fornia opinion, however, suggests
little desire to expand the Arizona exception in the future. Moreover, the Boulder Canyon Project is easily distinguished from most
Bureau projects. First, the Boulder Canyon Project touches many
states: project water from an interstate stream is distributed to users
in Nevada, California, and Arizona. Most of the Bureau's projects,
such as the Central Valley Project, distribute water in only one state.
And among those projects using water from interstate streams, the
Boulder Canyon Project was unusual in that, at the time the project
was established, the concerned states had not agreed on a means of
assessing their relative rights to water. 82 Therefore, the Act had to
apportion water among the states, 83 relying on the Secretary's contracts with water users within the several states. 84 Second, the statutes authorizing the Boulder Canyon Project are far more
comprehensive than the authorizing legislation for the rest of the Bureau's projects.85 Finally, section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project
79.
80.
81.
82.

438 U.S. at 678 n.31.
438 U.S. at 668 n.21.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
See generally Corker, Water Rights in Interstate Streams in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 293-372. (R. Clark ed. 1967). Three methods exist for states to establish an apportionment of interstate streams: an interstate compact with approval of Congress; an equitable
apportionment action within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and an act of
Congress. The last technique was recognized by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 564-65 (1963), where it approved the apportionment of waters of the lower Colorado River by the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
83. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-65 (1963).
84. To obtain water from the Project, users had to contract with the Secretary, who was
guided in his contracts by the congressional apportionment.
85. The Boulder Canyon Project Act is codified separately from the authorizations of other
projects of a size requiring congressional approval. Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057,
43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617u, 618-618p (1976). Moreover, the Act as codified occupies nearly a
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Act is unique in that it authorizes the Secretary to enter into contracts with individual waters users, 86 giving him greater discretion
than he possesses under the 1902 Act or any other legislation authorizing a reclamation project.
Cal!fornia and Arizona thus suggest that Congress has occupied
the field of reclamation law only where a project distributes water to
users in several states, and state laws or compacts do not provide
adequate coordination for distributing that water. 87 Furth_ermore,
Ca/!fornia hints that the Court will find the necessary intent to occupy the field only where Congress drafts unusually complex and
explicit authorizing legislation. California may thus be said to hold
that outside the narrow scope of the Arizona exception, state laws
regulating federal reclamation projects are presumptively valid unless they directly conflict with a specific federal statute.

B. Preemption by Co,iffict
Preemption by conflict requires a direct and obvious clash between the state and federal law.88 Such a clash is clearest when compliance with the terms of both the federal and state directives is
impossible. 89 In such cases, the supremacy clause renders the
strength of the state interest irrelevant. Courts, however, usually demand a convincing showing of conflict before they will invalidate a
state law: "[T]he repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand
together. " 90
Ivanhoe offers an excellent example of a "direct" conflict. California law prohibited restrictions on the acreage a project user could
dozen pages. By comparison, most project authorizations occupy only a few special provisions. See, e.g., Baker Project, 43 U.S.C. §§ 616t-616w (1976); Norman Project, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 615aa-615hh (1976).
86. Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, § 5, 45 Stat. 1060 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976)).
87. A court might conclude that the Colorado River Storage Project, which provides for
development of the Upper Colorado River Basin, is "comprehensive" enough to warrant a
finding that Congress intended to occupy the field. The project involves massive development
of the water resources in a multistate area faced with some of the same problems as the Boulder Canyon Project. Act of Apr. 11, 1956, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105, as amended, 76 Stat. 102
(1962), 78 Stat. 852 (1964), 82 Stat. 896 (1968) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-6200 (1976)).
Other projects distributing water to more than one state include the Spokane Valley Project
(Washington and Idaho), Act of Sept. 16, 1959, Pub. L. No. 87-276, 73 Stat. 561, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 615s-615u (1976); and the San Juan-Chama Project (Colorado and New Mexico), Act of
June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96, 43 U.S.C. § 615ii (1976).
88. See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S.
227, 243 (1859).
89. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377-80 (1946); Clover Leaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 399-401
(1907).
90. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. 227, 243 (1859). See also California v. Zook, 336 U.S.
725, 733 (1949); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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irrigate, while Congress explicitly required a restriction. 91 Similarly,
Fresno presented a situation where the California priority system of
water uses flatly contradicted the priority system set forth in the federal reclamation act. 92 In these cases, the conflicting statutes clearly
required a .finding of preemption. Since the general respect for state
laws expressed in section 8 was not intended to override specific congressional intent expressed elsewhere in the reclamation laws, clearly
incompatible state water law cannot survive.
In the more difficult cases, such as Ca!!fornia, one could comply
with both federal and state law, although the state provision may
impede attainment of the federal goal. The State Board in California did not absolutely bar completion of the New Melones Dam. It
approved the Bureau's application for a permit but required several
measures to protect wildlife and ensure "beneficial use" of the appropriated waters.93 The Bureau never argued that it could not meet
the conditions; it argued simply that it did not have to meet them. 94
As a result, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the conditions imposed by the Board were incompatible with the project. The
Court held only that if the conditions were not incompatible, the
Bureau had to comply with them. It then remanded the case for
"additional factfinding."9s
Under standard preemption theory, where the state law and federal law are not explicitly contradictory, but are potentially inconsistent, the test is "whether, under the circumstances of the particular
case, ... [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress."96 The
Supreme Court has cautioned against preempt~g state laws due to
91. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). In Ivanhoe, the California Supreme Court held that the excess
land provision, 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976), violated California law. See text at note 26 S11pra.
92. See text at notes 31-34 S11pra.
93. 438 U.S. 645, 652 & n.8 (1978).
94. See text at notes 59-60 S11pra.
95. 438 U.S. at 679.
96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Supreme Court applied this principle
most clearly in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). In Sears, a state attempted to protect a lamp design that did not
qualify for a federal patent. Invalidating the state protection, the Court explained, "Just as a
State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law,
. . . give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws." 376
U.S. at 231. Perez involved a conflict between § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(1976), and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 28-1101
to -1225 (1956). The Bankruptcy Act allows the discharge of tort claims, but the Arizona Act
provided that an uninsured motorist against whom a judgment had been rendered concerning
an automobile accident would have his license and vehicle registration suspended until the
judgment was satisfied. The Act specified that a discharge in bankruptcy would not "relieve
the judgment debtor from any requirements of the article." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN, § 281163(B) (1956). The Court invalidated the Arizona law on the grounds that it frustrated the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, which was to give the debtor a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for the future, unhampered by any preexisting debt.
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minor potential conflicts with federal law, for to do so would "ignore
... this Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists." 97
The Court has been particularly reluctant to preempt state law
where the potentially conflicting federal legislation contemplates cooperation between state and federal officials. In New York State .Department of Social Services v. .Dublino,98 the Court stated, "Where
coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in pursuit of common purposes, the
case for federal preemption becomes a less persuasive one."99 In
.Dublino, the New York Department of Social Services required certain employable individuals to receive education and job training if
they were to continue to receive AFDC 100 payments. Dublino
claimed that the state program conflicted with a similar federal program.101 Because both the state and federal governments contributed to the AFDC program, the Court hesitated to strike down the
state program unless the conflict was significant. It noted that preemption is a "sweeping step that strikes at the core of state prerogative under the . . . program - a program which this court has been
careful to describe as a 'scheme of cooperative federalism.' " 102
Thus, where a party seeks to preempt a state law related to a program involving "cooperative federalism," a stronger showing of conflict is necessary to invalidate the state statute. Significantly, the
Court in California described the Reclamation Act of 1902 as an
early example of cooperative federalism. 103
97. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960). In Huron,
Detroit's smoke abatement ordinance prohibited conduct that federal ship licensing requirements allowed. See also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, (1976), where the Court reaffirmed its
preference for reconciling the operation of both state and federal statutory schemes with one
another rather than holding one completely ousted.
Unfortunately, the line between those cases where the Court upheld the challenged state
law and those where it has held the state law preempted is anything but bright. In Franklin
Natl. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954), for example, the Court struck down a state
statute prohibiting national banks from using the words "savings" or "saving" in their advertisements and business. The Court found that the statute conflicted with § 24 of the Federal
Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1952). The Reserve Act authorized national banks to "continue
hereafter to receive time and savings deposits." The Court held that the state prohibition on
advertising impaired the power implicitly granted national banks by the Federal Reserve Act.
98. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
99. 413 U.S. at 421.
100. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976). It provides financial assistance for families with dependent children
living at home. The New York work rules are codified in N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 350-b to -i
(McKinney 1976).
101. Federal Work Incentive Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-644 (1976).
102. 413 U.S. at 413.
103. "If the term 'cooperative federalism' had been in vogue in 1902, the Reclamation Act
of that year would surely have qualified as a leading example of it . . . . Reflective of the
'cooperative federalism' which the Act embodied is § 8." California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645, 650 (1978).
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Against this doctrinal background, the Court will probably not
find many state water law provisions preempted by conflicts with
federal reclamation statutes. Most reclamation projects serve several
purposes, 104 which often conflict with each other. For example, the
New Melones Dam had, according to the Court, "the multiple purposes of flood control, irrigation, municipal use, industrial use,
power, recreation, water quality control, and the protection of fish
and wildlife." 105 Yet it is impossible to maximize all of these purposes simultaneously. To control floods best, a reservoir should be
emptied immediately after a flood, to be ready for the next one; yet
irrigation is best served by filling the reservoir in the spring and
gradually drawing the level down during the dry summer months;
and for best recreational use, the reservoir should be nearly full at all
times. 106
State water law will rarely be wholly inconsistent with such multiple purposes. Typically, a state water law will impair one purpose
but promote another. 107 Thus, instead of clearly frustrating federal
purposes, state law will usually establish priorities among the project's conflicting purposes. Section 8 thus gives the states significant
latitude to protect and promote the beneficial use of their waters. Of
course, Congress may limit or eliminate that latitude by enunciating
its own priority of purposes in legislation authorizing a reclamation
project. Where Congress has done so, contrary state purposes and
priorities must fall. However, under the resuscitated section 8, Congress must express its wish to preempt state law in explicit terms.
Since most reclamation projects espouse multiple purposes, some of
which are compatible with state water law, 108 state rules will control
most of the projects to which they apply.
104. For instance, Congress authorized the Arbuckle Project in Oklahoma for the "principal" purposes of "storing," regulating, and furnishing water for municipal, domestic, and industrial use, and for controlling floods and for the conservation and development of fish and
wildlife, and the enhancement of recreational opportunities." Act of Aug. 24, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-594, 76 Stat. 395 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 616K (1976)). See also San Angelo Project,
Texas, Act of Aug. 16, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-152, 71 Stat. 372 (codified at 43 U.S.C, § 6150
(1976)).
105. 438 U.S. at 651.
106. See A. G0LZE, RECLAMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 167 (1961).
107. For example, the State Board in California was particularly concerned that the Project
not interfere with in-stream uses for wildlife and recreation. 438 U.S. at 652 n.8.
108. Few of the Bureau's major projects have only a single purpose, and these few generally involve wells and pumping stations, not reservoirs. For instance, the Spokane Valley Project, Washington and Idaho, Pub. L. No. 87-630, § la, 76 Stat. 431 (1962) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 615s (1976)), provides water for irrigation and municipal use, two relatively compatible purposes. (The uses are compatible as both require a gradual use of stored supply during
the dry period, with replenishment during the wet period.) If a state impairs the purpose of a
single-purpose project (or a project with compatible purposes), it is not merely shifting the
priorities among multiple purposes, but is obstructing a clear directive of Congress. In such a
case, preemption is indisputable.
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.APPLYING CALIFORNIA

In California, the Supreme Court departed from its restricted
construction of section 8 in Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona. But California left unanswered a few specific questions about the scope of
section 8's applicability. This Section offers tentative responses to
two of these questions .
.Does California allow state law to alter existing projects?
California involved state restrictions on a project that the Bureau
had not yet built. However, since the Court's opinion mandated that
the Secretary conform with state law relating to the "control, appropriation, use or distribution of water," 109 state water law could also
affect existing Bureau projects. Such an application of a new state
law is not improbable. 110 A similar problem would arise if state officials had not attempted to apply existing law to a project because of
mistaken assumptions about the proper construction of section 8.
California suggests that standard preemption doctrine should still
govern a retroactive application of the state law. 111 However, the
application would have to survive a two-pronged test: The law
would have to satisfy the California preemption standard, and it
would then have to undergo scrutiny for unconstitutional retroactivity.112

While the constitutional implications of retroactive legislation
are beyond the scope of this Note, it should be observed that there
are several obstacles 113 to applying subsequently adopted state laws
to an existing project if the application would threaten the project's
109. 438 U.S. at 674. Although it is conceivable that a future Court might deem this language improvident dicta and limit Cal!fomia to the issue of state appropriation regulations,
such a prospect is unlikely.
110. For example, a state safety law relating to dams could require changes in Bureau
operating procedures, a new state water quality law might require water releases to meet quality standards, or a state might alter its statutory definition of beneficial use to exclude a use
currently made by an individual receiving project water.
111. "A retroactive statute is one which gives to preenactment conduct a different legal
effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute." Hochman, 17ze
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692
(1960).
112. Professor Hochman suggests that courts should weigh three factors to determine the
validity of retroactive legislation: (1) the nature and strength of the public interest served by
the legislation, (2) the extent of abrogation of the asserted preenactment right, and (3) the
degree to which the right has been asserted and enforced prior to the enactment of the statute.
Furthermore, he notes that the "Court has consistently held that not all [retroactive] ..• statutes are unconstitutional, but only those which, upon a balancing of the considerations on both
sides, are felt to be unreasonable." Id. at 694-95. See also Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1960).
113. State retroactive legislation is often attacked on the ground that it impairs the obligation of contracts. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn.,
310 U.S. 32 (1940); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). It can also be
stricken for depriving persons of property without just compensation or due process. U.S.
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economic feasibility. When projects are initiated, the Bureau conducts studies to ascertain whether the project is economically feasible. In this analysis, the Bureau allocates project costs between
"reimbursable uses," such as irrigation, industrial uses, and the municipal water supply, all of which return money to the Bureau, and
"nonreimbursable uses," such as fish and wildlife management, recreation, and flood control. The Bureau only undertakes projects approaching economic self-sufficiency. 114 Thus, new state regulations
could alter facts about state law that the Bureau had justifiably relied
on when it initiated the project. If, for example, a state law required
the release of impounded water to enhance stream values, it would
reduce the amount available for reimbursable uses. As a result, the
federal government would lose funds and be forced to subsidize improvement of the local environment. Of course, the state might compensate the Bur~au for the diversion, but compensation might not
save government contracts with water users, some of which could not
be performed because of the reduced amount of water available to
the Bureau. Moreover, by obtaining valid permits and completing
construction of a project, the Bureau may acquire vested property
rights, just like an individual appropriator. The state would have to
compensate the Bureau for taking these property rights in the same
manner as it would compensate individual property owners. Thus,
any state law that would alter the operation of an existing project
should be subject to close examination. 115
Does California allow state law to prevent construction
of a project completely?

While the lower courts in California ruled that the state must issue the Bureau a permit if unappropriated water exists, 116 the
Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue. Several states
have provisions authorizing the state board to refuse any appropriation permit if the board determines that it would not be in the public
interest. 117 Thus, unless prevented by clear congressional directives,
CoNST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rudford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935).
114. In reality, Bureau projects have never paid for themselves. Nevertheless, the Bureau
does not initiate projects unless it decides that the return of money from reimbursable uses,
coupled with public benefits from the nonreimbursable aspects of a project, justify the expen•
diture required. See A. Goue, supra note 106, at 218-28.
115. Presumably, the challenge to most retroactive state laws reducing the capacity of a
project would be based either on the contract clause or the due process clause. As Professor
Hochman indicates, the Court's decision will be heavily influenced by the public interests
served on both sides. Hochman, supra note 111, at 694. A typical case might balance the
Bureau's interest in having a dependable water supply against a growing public interest in an
in-stream use.
116. See text at notes 64-65 supra.
117. See note 14 supra.
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these states could theoretically thwart the initiation of a project
within their boundaries.
Under the Reclamation Act of 1902, the Secretary was "authorized in his discretion to locate and construct reclamation projects." 118
The Cal!fornia Court believed that the history of section 8 demonstrated that if "state law did not allow for the appropriation . . . of
the necessary water, Congress did not intend the Secretary . . . to
initiate the project." 119 However subsequent legislation authorizing
a project may evince a specific congressional intent that the Secretary be allowed to appropriate or condemn the required water, and
thus override the general intent to honor state law embodied in section 8.1 20
As a practical matter, this problem is unlikely to arise. Because
reclamation programs almost invariably entail federal-state cooperation, the Bureau will probably not initiate a project unless the states
involved have indicated their support. Nevertheless, the Court in
Cal!fornia left open the possibility that states might deny the Bureau
permits because of their own public interest assessments. Cal!fornia
should require the Bureau to respect such assessments, absent a clear
contrary signal from Congress.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As a result of Cal!fornia, the states have regained control over
their waters, control that earlier decisions construing section 8 had
apparently removed. This victory may hold more academic than
practical significance, as disputes between the states and the Bureau
should seldom reach the courts. All the Western states participate in
the planning of new reclamation projects within their borders. Furthermore, since the enactment of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 121
they also review reports of projects proposed by the Bureau. 122 State
participation in the planning stages should resolve most state objections before the. Bureau undertakes a project. 123
118. See 438 U.S. at 669 n.21.
119. See 438 U.S. at 669 n.21.
120. No such legislation was before the Court in Cal!fomia, and hence this issue was left
unanswered. 438 U.S, at 669 n.21.
121. 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-l(c) (1976)): "In the event a submission of views and recommendations, made by an affected State ... sets forth objections to the
plans or proposals covered by the report of the Secretary of the Interior, the proposed works
shall not be deemed authorized except upon approval by an Act of Congress."
See also 43 U.S.C. § 422(d) (1976): "Any proposal with respect to the construction of a
project which has not theretofore been authorized for construction under the Federal reclamation laws ... shall have been submitted for review by the States of the drainage basin in
which the project is located in like manner as provided in section 701-l(c) of Title 33."
122. A. GoLZE, supra note 106, at lll-12.
123. Most state-federal conflicts in reclamation will probably arise either when state law is
changed after the initiation of a project, or when there is a significant time lapse between the
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However, for those federal-state conflicts over reclamation
projects that persist, 124 Ca!!fornia offers courts new guidelines for interpreting the ubiquitous section 8. It acknowledges congressional
occupancy of a narrow field of reclamation law - the law governing
the Boulder Canyon Project. It also calls for preemption where it is
physically impossible to comply with both state and federal mandates, and where state law is clearly inconsistent with an express congressional purpose. On the other hand, where state law enhances
certain federal objectives and incidentally impedes - but does not
bar - attainment of others, Ca!!fornia requires the state provision to
control.
Because its holding was limited, 125 the Court in Ca/!fornia left
many gaps for the lower courts to fill. Most notably, the decision
planning stage and the time for requesting an appropriation permit, during which conditions
have changed to make the project less attractive to the state. Disputes may also arise as a
result of the necessarily vague plans the Bureau has at the project-initiation stage regarding
exactly who will receive water and on what terms. This was one of the difficulties in Ca/!fornia. The California State Water Resources Board was concerned that, at the time of application, the Bureau did not have firm commitments for the use of project water. See note 52
SIIJJra. However, as a practical matter, the Bureau usually does not enter into contracts with
ultimate users until it is assured that it will receive water for its projects.
Where the Bureau's plans are vague, a state may not realize that the intended use is contrary to state law until after the appropriation permit is granted, and the Bureau enters into
contracts with water users. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util.
Dist., 125 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1976), qjfd., 20 Cal. 3d 327, 572 P.2d 1128, 142 Cal. Rptr. 904,
vacated, 439 U.S. 811 (1978).
124. Certain provisions in state water laws are likely to foment such conflicts. For instance, statutes establishing priority of water use are in effect in many states. See, e.g., ARIZ,
R.E.v. STAT. ANN. § 45-147 (1979). These statutes generally provide that domestic use shall
have priority over irrigation, and irrigation over industrial use. Some Western states also prohibit the appropriation of water for use outside of the state, which could pose conflicts with
federal projects proposing to distribute water to users in several states. See, e.g., OR. REV,
STAT.§ 537.810 (1977); Cow. REV. STAT.§ 37-81-101 (1973). The continued validity of these
statutes may well be in doubt. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966),
qjfd., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
Some states statutorily define beneficial use by excluding certain uses that are deemed not
beneficial. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN, § 89-2911(4) (1977 Supp.) (use of water to
export coal slurry from the state is not a beneficial use). Problems may arise when, after the
state has appropriated water to the Bureau, the Secretary in his discretion contracts with a user
whose use would not be beneficial. See note 123 Sllpra.
A few states specifically limit the amount of water per acre that may be appropriated for
irrigation. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 33 (West 1970). If a Bureau contract exceeded the statutory limit, courts and administrative agencies would face a Ca/!fornia problem.
Finally, many states place dams and reservoirs under the jurisdiction of state administrative
officials. Arizona, for example, provides that all dams in the state are under the jurisdiction of
the state engineer, and virtually nothing affecting a dam can be done without his approval.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-702(A) (1956). If the state engineer in performing his job decided
that some aspect of the dam was unsatisfactory a conflict could arise with officials in the Bureau who believed present operations or structures were satisfactory.
None of these statutory provisions, however, necessarily conflicts with federal reclamation
projects. By working together in the planning process, state and federal officials could avoid
much litigation and develop projects that better meet the needs of state citizens as well as
citizens across the nation.
125. See text at notes 93-95 SIIJJra.
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does not clarify satisfactorily the distinction between intrastate and
comprehensive interstate projects such as the Boulder Canyon Project in Arizona. 126 But whatever its shortcomings, the opinion supplies a sound legal framework for supervising the continuing
cooperation between states and the Bureau in planning, constructing,
and operating reclamation projects.

126. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

